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I. Introduction
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected the winning design from the two nuclear
weapons laboratories for the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) on March 2, 2007. The winning design
by the Lawrence–Livermore National Laboratory was the more cautious design, and had been tested
previously. The Los Alamos design was more creative, but had not been nuclear tested. With the Cold
War over, NNSA is planning to make warheads that are less constrained in weight and, in principle, more
reliable. The Congress and the Executive Branch have agreed that RRW will not be tested before it enters
the stockpile. Of course, this does not guarantee that the decision not to test could not be reversed in the
future. The JASON group will comment on the RRW designs during the next year and the American
Association for the Advancement of Science will release its report on the RRW in March 2007. Our
discussion is intended as background material to help understand the RRW decisions and reports. On
March 6, a session at the Denver APS meeting considered the RRW and nuclear missions. Talks were
given by John Harvey (Director of NNSA Policy and Planning), Lt. General C. Robert Kehler (Deputy
Commander of STRATCOM), Bruce Tarter (Chair of the AAAS–RRW Study), Sidney Drell (Stanford),
Ivan Oelrich (Federation of American Scientists). The need for the RRW has been called into doubt by
the 2006 JASON report that concluded the following: [1]
“Most primary types have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years as regards aging of
plutonium; those with assessed minimum lifetime of 100 years or less have clear mitigation paths that are
proposed and/or being implemented...There is no evidence for void swelling in naturally –Pu samples
over the actual and acceleratedδaged or artificially aged times scales examined to date, and good reason
to believe it will not occur on times scales of interest, if at all. Systems with large margins will remain so
far greater than 100 years with respect to Pu aging. Thus, the issue of Pu aging is secondary to the issue of
managing margins.”
There is a strong consensus in the US that the primary mission of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear
attacks by other nations. However, there is also a strong consensus that nuclear weapons do not deter
terrorism by non-state actors. These views were summarized by former Secretaries of State George Shultz
and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Chair of the Senate Armed
Services Committee Sam Nunn and others, who commented in the Wall Street Journal of 4 January 2007
that “reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose [deterrence] is becoming increasing hazardous and
decreasingly effective.”[2] They also recommended ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) by “Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase
confidence and provide periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states.”
The main technical issue that blocked CTBT ratification in 1999 was the following: “Will nuclear
weapons be sufficiently reliable if they are not tested for centuries?” This question is somewhat
misleading since a nation can always withdraw from the CTBT under Article IX when its “supreme
interests” are jeopardized. The other main CTBT issues have been or are being solved sufficiently for
ratification by the Senate:

(1) CTBT Effective Verification. The CTBT will be “effectively verifiable” when the International
Monitoring System is complete and because regional seismic monitoring has greatly improved, along
with improvements with seismic arrays and analysis, interferometric synthetic aperture radar and
cooperative monitoring. The level at which cheating could take place would not significantly threaten US
national security, according to the Nitze–Baker criteria used for the INF and START I-II treaties.[3] The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 2002 study on the CTBT concluded the following on monitoring
with a fully deployed primary seismic network:[4]
Underground explosions can be detected and can be identified as explosions, using IMS data, down to a
yield of 0.1 kt [tamped] in hard rock if conducted anywhere in Europe Asia, North America and North
Africa. In some locations of interest, such as Novaya Zemlya, this capability extends down to 0.01 kt or
less.

(2) CTBT (with–compliance) vs. no–CTBT vs. CTBT (with–evasion). The NAS panel
examined these three situations for seven nations ( Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iraq and
Iran), concluding the following:[5]
States with extensive prior test experience [Russia and China] are the ones most likely to be able to get
away with any substantial degree of clandestine testing, and they are also the ones most able to benefit
technically from clandestine testing under the severe constrains that the monitoring system will
impose….Countries with lesser prior test experience and/or design sophistication would also lack the
sophisticated test–related expertise to extract much value from such very–low–yield tests as they might be
able to conceal….The worse–case scenario under a no–CTBT regime poses far bigger threats to US
security interests––sophisticated nuclear weapons in the hands of many more adversaries––than the
worst–case scenario of clandestine testing in a CTBT regime, within the constraints posed by the
monitoring system.

(3) Nuclear Safety. Only one US nuclear weapon accident has taken place since 1968, which was the
1980 accident of a liquid–fueled missile. This accident did not spread radioactivity and is now irrelevant
since all liquid–fueled nuclear missiles have been decommissioned. Only two of the 32 accidents spread
considerable radioactivity, which were both aircraft accidents. Practically all (29 of 32) nuclear weapon
accidents were with aircraft, which no longer carry nuclear weapons unless placed on alert. The least safe
nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and SRAMs) have been decommissioned and safety procedures have
been modified for submarine weapons. A 1992 law required that the Defense Department to do a cost–
benefit analysis on safety issues to determine whether new warheads that needed nuclear testing were cost
effective. Both Republican and Democratic administrations have since testified that new weapons are not
needed to enhance safety. There are no significant safety problems that require nuclear testing to resolve
them.

II. NAS Panel Conclusions on Reliability.
•
•
•
•

The NAS panel determined that, under these conditions, US warheads could remain safe
and reliable without testing:
Maintain a high-quality workforce.
Stockpile stewardship and enhanced surveillance must examine components of weapons.
Based on past experience, the majority of aging problems will be found in the nonnuclear components, which can be fully tested under a CTBT.
The most likely potential source of nuclear-related degradation is the possibility that the
primary yield falls below a minimum level needed to drive a secondary. NNSA has

•
•

concluded that plutonium pits have a minimum lifetime of 45-60 years [now 100 years]
with "no life-limiting factors as yet recognized."
In the past there were few underground nuclear explosions that explicitly served to check
the reliability of weapons in the stockpile. Most nuclear tests were used to study and
certify new designs and to examine weapons effects.
Remanufacture to original specifications is the preferred approach for age-related defects,
with a highly disciplined process to install few changes without changing the basic
nuclear design.

The NAS panel continually asked weapon designers during classified briefings on the enduring stockpile
whether testing was needed to resolve the issue under discussion. NNSA weapon scientists always
responded that testing was not needed to solve the issue under discussion. The NAS panel concluded the
following, based on their experience and the briefings:
Although a properly focused stockpile stewardship program is capable, in our judgment, of maintaining
the required confidence in the enduring stockpile under a CTBT, we do not believe that it will lead to a
capability to certify new nuclear subsystem design for entry in the stockpile without nuclear testing -unless by accepting a substantial reduction in the confidence in weapon performance associated with the
certification up until now, or a return to earlier, simpler, single stage design concepts such as gun-type
weapons.
It seems to us that the argument to the contrary – that is, the argument that improvements in the
capabilities that underpin confidence in the absence of nuclear testing will inevitably lose the race with
the growing needs from an aging stockpile – underestimates the current capability for stockpile
stewardship, underestimates the effects of current and likely future rates of progress in improving these
capabilities, and overestimates the role that nuclear testing ever played (or would be ever likely to play) in
ensuring stockpile reliability.
These conclusions are consistent with the fact that the United States has not needed to test in the 15 years
since the testing moratorium began in 1992. Each year the US government has stated that it is “confident
that the stockpile is safe and reliable, and there is no requirement at this time for nuclear tests.”[6] The
annual certification on stockpile readiness requires the Secretary of Defense (after advice from Strategic
Command and the military services) and the Secretary of Energy (after advice from the three weapon
laboratory directors and the NNSA Administrator) to determine whether all safety and reliability
requirements are being met without the need for nuclear testing. These reports have always certified that
the stockpile does not need testing for reasons of safety or reliability. The NAS panel concluded, with
these caveats, that testing is not needed in future years: (1) A robust stockpile stewardship program, (2)
no new weapon designs, and (3) the right of the United States to withdraw from the CTBT if the United
States decides it must test to defend its national security.
About $7 billion is spent annually to maintain the enduring stockpile (Table 1) and infrastructure under
the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and the Lifetime Extension Program (LEP). Sidney Drell and
Robert Peurifoy discussed the technical issues involved with a nuclear test ban.[7] The main threat to
warhead reliability is caused by non-nuclear components, which is usually observable without testing on
these issues: insufficient tritium, faulty tritium bottles, corrosion of fissile material, degradation of high
explosive, low–temperature performance, vulnerability to fratricide neutrons, radar, batteries, fuse switch,
neutron generator, faulty cables, trajectory sensors, control systems, rocket motor, gas transfer valve,
firing set, and pilot parachute. The warheads in the enduring stockpile have been tested 150–200 times.

Table 1. US Nuclear Warheads in the Enduring Stockpile (2006). Warhead types that are to be
partially dismantled are marked with an *. This table does not include the B62 (580 warheads) and W84
(383 warheads), which are scheduled for full dismantlement. [R.S. Norris and H.M. Kristensen[8]]

Type

Yield

Platform

Active

Inactive

Total

B61/3*

10-350 kt

airplane

200

186

386

B61/4*

10-350 kt

airplane

200

204

404

B61/7

10-350 kt

airplane

215

224

439

B61/11

10-350 kt

airplane

20

21

41

B83

1.2 Mt.

airplane

320

306

626

W76*

100 kt

SLBM

1712

1318

3030

W78*

335 kt

ICBM

785

20

805

W80/1*

150 kt

ALCM

1450

361

1811

W87

300 kt

ICBM

0

553

553

W88

475 kt

SLBM

404

0

404

5306

3193

8499

TOTAL

Eleven warheads of each type are annually taken to the Pantex facility, disassembled and examined for
deterioration. The JASON group recommended a variety of measures to increase performance margins of
warheads, beyond increasing tritium content in the warhead.[9] Warheads will have to be rebuilt; the
question is how often with 100–year pit lifetimes. The basic science of warheads and their viability are
examined with the technologies listed below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

visual observation for corrosion, deterioration, cracks and other issues
chemical, electrical, ultrasonic, diamond-anvil, and other tests
functional testing of components
X–ray scattering to search for changes
deep penetration digital radiography to detect flaws and cracks (core punch)
laser scattering to study surface imperfections
synchrotron–based spectroscopy and diffraction
reassembled device without SNM tested to destruction (Joint Test Assembly)
subcritical and hydrodynamic tests (Rebound, Holog, Joint Actinide Shock Physics
Experimental Research, Atlas pulse power machine, critical assemblies at Device
Assembly Facility).
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro Test (DAHRT)
Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program
accelerated aging of pits with shorter–lived plutonium–238
National Ignition Facility (not yet functioning)

III. NNSA Definition of Reliability
The United States has not tested each warhead type enough times to determine reliability with high confidence
statistics, and certainly not for the effects of aging. Assume ten reliability tests were performed and all were
successful. The reliability is not 100 percent with 100 percent confidence, but rather there is a 30 percent chance that
reliability is less than 90 percent and a 10 percent chance that reliability is less than 80 percent.[10] Thus, the
United States has never known warhead reliability with precision when the warhead entered the stockpile, nor has
the United States searched sufficiently for aging effects with confidence tests.

NNSA Definition of Reliability. “The reliability of obtaining the predicted yield of a nuclear weapon has
never been assessed because there have never been enough performance [nuclear] tests to establish a statistical
reliability. Thus, when a defect type impacting the nuclear explosive package is discovered, the yield performance is
evaluated, but no reliability degradation estimate can be made. Therefore, no data is available regarding analysis
relating to reliability degradation to predicted yields.….In general terms, reliability is defined as the ability of an
item to perform a required function. Implicit in the above definition of ‘required function’ for one–shot devices,
such as nuclear weapons, are the required conditions and duration of storage, transportation, and function.”[11] In
other words, when a few successful tests give the design yield, the reliability of a warhead type is defined as 1.0, but
without a confidence level. When actionable defects are detected, NNSA analysis reduces reliability of 1.0 by an
amount R to give a reduced-reliability for each warhead type. NNSA set numerical bounds on reliability reductions
RΔ for 164 actionable defects in 46 warhead types, mostly in the 39 retired warhead types:[12] ΔR = 0–1% (112
defect types), RΔ = 1–5% (37), RΔ = 5–10% (6), RΔ > 10% (9).
The effect on secondary yield of radiant energy transfer from the primary stage is very nonlinear. A drop in primary
yield by a factor of two, for example, could greatly reduce the secondary yield because critical pressures and
temperatures may not be obtained. However weapon yield is not a “step function” that varies between two values,
zero and certified yield. NNSA is concerned about catastrophic failure of an entire type. This is partially driven by
the fact that yield on target is usually much larger than what is needed for particular missions, so the only issue is
“does it work.” NNSA does not consider the criteria for nuclear missions in any depth since targeting is left to the
Strategic Command. Since there are 7 warhead types in the enduring stockpile, a catastrophic failure of one type
would shift responsibility to the other six types, with time to repair the catastrophic failure.

IV. Requirements for Reliability and Yield.
NNSA does not consider nuclear targeting for its annual certification report. Since the accuracy of missiles is a
statistical phenomenon, statistical analysis is necessary to quantify destruction of targets to determine if warhead
degradation is relevant or not. The ability to destroy a target depends on (1) the hardness H of the target (minimum
destruction pressure), (2) the yield Y of the weapon, (3) the accuracy of the weapon (CEP, circular error probable),
(4) the reliability R of the weapon system (0 to 1), and (5) the number n of warheads attacking a target (taking into
account fratricide).[13] The single–shot–kill–probability SSKP is the kill probability of a single warhead on a known
target with perfect reliability of R = 1. We initially assume lethal warheads with SSKP = 1, giving a kill probability
for one warhead of P 1 = R. If n independent warheads from n missiles are used on a target without fratricide, the kill
probability is P n = 1 – (1 – R)n. Reliability of R = 0.5 gives P 2 = 0.75 and P 3 = 0.88, and R = 0.25 gives P 2 = 0.44
and P 3 = 0.58. Except for the case of a pre-emptive attack against a large force, additional warheads on a target can
be used for case of reduced reliability.
The kill capability of one W88 warhead of 475 kilotons with 100–meter CEP accuracy attacking a 2000–psi hard
target silo with 0.9 reliability is P 1 = 0.898. If the W88 yield is reduced by 50%, P 2 = 0.99 and P 3 = 0.998, and if
yield is reduced by 90%, P 2 = 0.88 and P 3 = 0.96. These results show that large yield reductions do not significantly
change P 2 and P 3 .
Testing data obtained from DOE with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request is discussed below.[14] Some
warhead types had problems during the early transition to miniaturized warheads with reduced mass and
volume.[15] The 1958–61 testing moratorium prevented tests at the time these new warheads entered the force.

Actionable defects, identified by stockpile stewardship and not by nuclear tests, are listed in Table 2; those marked
with an * needed a retrofit or a major redesign. The last column gives the year of discovery of the defect after the
first production unit (FPU). Three warheads were retrofitted: (1) B61, 3 years after FPU, (2) W80, 1 year after FPU,
and W88 at 1, 1, 2, and 3 years after FPU. This and other data suggest that primary/secondary stages do not show
significant aging problems once they have been in the field for a few years. The average age of discovery for the 6
retrofits in Table 2 was 1.8 years after FPU. Five retrofit types were for primaries and one was for a secondary. All
six retrofits were from design flaws, causing yield reduction (in 4 cases), reduced safety (1 case) and non-applicable
(1 case). The average discovery time for the retired warhead types was 1.9 years after FPU for the 33 primary and 1
secondary stages. Retrofits were caused by design flaws (33), aging (5) and production (1), which effected safety
(19), reliability (6), yield reduction (5) and not applicable (4).

Table 2. Actionable defects for warheads in the enduring stockpile. Those that required a retrofit or
major design change are marked with an *. This table does not include the 39 retired warhead types.
Nuclear components are primary (p) and secondary (s) with number of generic events in parentheses.
Causes are aging (A), design (D), and production (P), without needing the causes of field induced (F),
unknown (U), and combination of design/production (C). Effects from the causes are safety (S) (nuclear
detonation safety, nuclear material scatter, or personnel safety), operational yield reduction (O), and not
applicable (na), and reliability reduction (R, which was not applicable here). [Table 6, FOIA–NNSA]

primary(p)
secondary(s) cause
effect
(number)
A,C,D,P,U R,S,O,na
B61 p(2)
s(2)

D*, P
P, P

O*, O
S, S

B83 p(0)
s(0)

FPU: yr after
1980-86: 3*, 3
6,7
1983:

W76 p(2)
s(1)

P, P
P

na,O
O

1979: 1,4
6

W78 p(3)
s(0)

P, A, D

O, na, S

1980: 3,6,11

W80 p(2)
s(2)

D*, P

O*,O
na, na

W87 p(0)
s(0)
W88 p(3)
s(2)

1981-4: 1*, 1
1,5
1986:

D*, D*, D* na*, S*, O*
D*, D
O*, O

1988: 1*, 2*, 3*
1*, 3

Table 2 suggests that primaries are much more vulnerable than secondaries. The two sets of data (retired
and enduring warheads) show that the average age of discovery is less than two years after the first
production unit. The full data set gives the main cause of diminished reliability, which results from
failures of non-nuclear components, not failures of nuclear stages. Drell and Peurifoy quantified warhead
reliability as follows: “Since the start of the current stockpile evaluation and reliability assessment
program in 1958, about 13,000 weapon evaluations have been conducted. During this period, the failure
rate of the nondevice hardware suggests an expected weapon failure rate of 1–2% for the stockpile.”[16]

Missile failure rates are larger, as pointed out by Richard Feynman, whose estimates were 2% for mature
solid–fueled missiles and 4% for all solid–fueled missiles.[17]
These actionable defects for the enduring stockpile were all discovered by stockpile stewardship, except
for the W80 cruise missile warhead, which revealed a cold temperature detonation problem. DOE was
asked about the “four Product Change Proposals that required underground tests since 1970.” The FOIA
response below stated that only 4 tests were used; 2 for enduring stockpile weapons and 2 for now retired
warheads:[18]
1. B61/Mod-1 conversion to B61/Mod-7 (Underground testing was used to compare nuclear
performance of the insensitive, IHE–primary relative to the former HE–primary being
replaced) – 13 years post B61/Mod-1 FPU.
2. W68 (Underground testing verified a corrective change replacing the primary HE) – 7
years post FPU;
3. W79 (Underground testing confirmed a safety problem) – 7 years post FPU; and
4. W80 (Underground testing revealed a cold temperature detonation problem) – within 1
year FPU.
The FOIA response described Major Product Change Proposals for warheads in the enduring stockpile.
Six of the 36 proposals affected the primary or secondary and 30 were for non-nuclear components. A
new pit was incorporated for the B61 in the first year after FPU and high explosive specifications were
changed 3 years after FPU. Thirteen years after FPU the B61/Mod–1 pit was modified for insensitive high
explosive for Mod–7, the earth penetrator, which was nuclear tested. The W88 primary and secondary
was modified during 1–3 years after FPU. The W80 primary was modified one year after FPU for cold–
temperature performance.

Conclusion.
The data presented in this paper suggest that US nuclear warheads continue to be reliable, consistent with
the annual certification by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy. Plutonium aging is no longer a
significant issue, as shown by natural– and accelerated–aged plutonium samples. It is imperative that the
missions for nuclear weapons be considered when modernizing and sizing the US nuclear weapons
stockpile. NNSA is given very high requirements for yield and reliability by the Department of Defense.
But these very high requirements are only relevant for a pre-emptive attack on Russia (perhaps China in
the future). The Defense Department maintains these extremely high standards for this type of attack, but
this policy leads the United States to reject the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an act which is
counter–productive to the US goal of reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation. Secrecy and vagueness
have prevented a relevant discussion on weapon reliability and its impact on the CTBT. The 6 December
2006 vote on the resolution favoring the CTBT in the UN General Assembly shows that practically all
nations strongly prefer a completed CTBT, as they fail to understand US views on the reliability of
nuclear weapons. The vote was 172 in favor to 2 against (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
United States), with 4 abstentions (Colombia, India, Mauritius, Syria). The data presented in this paper
suggest that the 172 votes in favor of the CTBT are well justified by the facts.
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